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OIL, GAS, AND MINERALS
by
Eric T Laity*
HIS Article surveys the significant developments of the past year in
the Texas law of oil, gas, and minerals.' The scope of this Article is
limited to decisions by Texas and federal courts, enactments of the
Texas Legislature, and rules and regulations promulgated by Texas administrative agencies. This Article does not cover developments in the
taxation or federal regulation of oil, gas, and minerals, nor does the Article
cover developments in international energy law.
I.

A.

CASE LAW

Surface Deposits of Minerals

In Moser v. United States Steel Corp.2 the Texas Supreme Court abandoned the surface destruction test developed in Acker v. Guinn 3 and Reed v.
Wylie. 4 Instead, the court held that ownership of near-surface minerals
depends on whether the substances are deemed to be minerals.5 The court
further held, however, that a surface owner is entitled to damages from the
owner of the mineral estate for any destruction of the land's surface caused
in recovering near-surface minerals. 6 A motion for rehearing is pending
before the supreme court at the time of this writing, and the court's response may clarify a number of problems left unresolved by the court's
initial opinion.
The Mosers owned the surface estate of a small tract of land and the
Gefferts owned the mineral estate. The tract in question was less than
seven acres in size. United States Steel Corporation, the Gefferts' lessee,
was mining uranium on the tract by an in situ leaching process. 7 The ura* A.B., J.D., Harvard University. Attorney at Law, Kilgore & Kilgore, Dallas, Texas.
1. The law of oil, gas, and minerals has historically focused on the exploration for and
production of minerals and hydrocarbons. By tradition, the law of oil, gas, and minerals has
not included the legal aspects of the transportation, refining, and marketing of minerals and
hydrocarbons. Neither have the organization and financing of the enterprises conducting
these various activities been considered to be within the ambit of oil, gas, and mineral law.
This Article preserves the traditional focus on the activities of exploration and production.
2. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 427 (June 8, 1983).
3. 464 S.W.2d 348, 352 (Tex. 1971).
4. 597 S.W.2d 743, 747 (Tex. 1980).
5. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 429.
6. Id.
7. The Gefferts had a second mineral lessee, N.M. Uranium, Inc. In addition, Atlantic
Richfield Company owned an overriding royalty interest in the uranium. The facts of the
Moser case have been simplified for this discussion.
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nium lay at varying depths and came as close as 193 feet to the surface.
The Mosers brought suit against the mineral owners and their lessees to
quiet title to the uranium, alleging that it was part of their surface estate
and relying on the surface destruction test enunciated in Reed v. Wylie. In
Reed the supreme court stated that any mineral found at or near the surface is deemed part of the surface estate if any reasonable method of recovery would destroy or deplete the surface of the land, unless the mineral8
had been specifically conveyed to or reserved by the mineral estate owner.
The court further held that any mineral found within 200 feet of the surface was "near surface" for purposes of the surface destruction test. 9 Relying on these standards, the court of civil appeals in Moser first found that
although some of the uranium was within 193 feet of the surface, the greatest concentration was at a depth of 325 feet. Consequently, the uranium
was not near the surface and, therefore, was part of the mineral owner's
estate.' 0 The court further held that at the time of trial the only reasonable
method of mining the uranium on the Moser tract was the in situ leaching
process actually in use, and that this method did not result in substantial
destruction of the land's surface."I United States Steel Corporation, therefore, could continue to mine the uranium as the lessee of the mineral estate
owner.
The supreme court agreed with the result reached by the court of civil
appeals but differed in its reasoning. The court initially stated that the
surface destruction test had led to title uncertainty, since ownership of
near-surface minerals depended upon determinations of fact in the absence of a specific grant or reservation of such minerals.' 2 Because of this
uncertainty, the supreme court abandoned the surface destruction test and
held instead that the ownership of a substance depends on whether the
substance is classified as a mineral by law. 13 Substances held to be minerals are part of the mineral estate, regardless of their proximity to the surface.' 4 A grant of "oil, gas, and other minerals" thus conveys all minerals
lying under the tract of land covered by the grant.' 5 The supreme court
6
concluded that uranium is a mineral and thus part of the mineral estate.'
The supreme court noted, however, that exploitation of a near-surface
mineral by the mineral owner might result in damage to or destruction of
the surface estate. The court also noted that if a mineral was not specifically mentioned in a landowner's grant of mineral rights, the surface owner might not have bargained for compensation in return for the destruction
of the surface. The court therefore held that a surface estate owner has a
right to damages from the mineral estate owner for any destruction of the
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.

597 S.W.2d at 747.
Id. at 748.
601 S.W.2d 731, 734 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1980).
Id.
26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 428.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 429.
Id.
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surface occurring during the course of mining a mineral unspecified in the
mineral grant or reservation.' 7 In the event that a mineral owner destroyed the land's surface while mining a mineral that was mentioned by
name in the mineral grant or reservation, however, the surface owner's
remedy would be limited to damages for excessive or negligent use or de8
struction of the surface.'
A motion for rehearing is pending in the Moser case.' 9 This motion
gives the supreme court an opportunity to consider several problems raised
by its initial opinion. 20 First, the Moser court provided that contracts,
leases, and deeds executed between February 10, 1971, and June 8, 1983,
would continue to be governed by the law in effect at the time of their
execution. 2' The court provided this window period to protect the rights
of contracting parties who relied on the court's holdings in Acker and
Reed.22 The window period, however, raises several problems. For example, the ownership of surface minerals is unclear if the mineral estate is
severed prior to the window period and the surface owner subsequently
executes a surface mineral lease during the window period. Under Moser,
the lessee of the surface owner has a protected claim to the minerals, since
the lease was executed during the window period. 23 Moser also suggests,
however, that the chain of title culminating in this protected lease must
17. Id.
18. Id. The actions of the mineral owner remain limited by the accommodation doc-

trine announced in Getty Oil Co. v. Jones, 470 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. 1971), regardless of
whether the mineral being mined was mentioned by name in the grant or reservation. 26
Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 430. Furthermore, the mineral owner will remain subject to the Uranium
Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 131.001-.270 (Vernon

1978). 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 429 n.4. Presumably the mineral owner will also be subject to
the companion statute, the Surface Mining and Reclamation Act, TEX. REV. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 5920-11 (Vernon 1964). This companion statute now applies to iron ore, in
addition to coal. See infra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
19. Until the supreme court's final opinion in Moser is delivered, the court may delay
ruling on the application for writ of error filed in Storm Assocs. v. Texaco, 645 S.W.2d 579
(Tex. App.-San Antonio 1982). Storm Assocs. deals with royalty interests and the surface
destruction test. The supreme court's treatment of Storm Assocs. may affect the application
of Martin v. Schneider, 622 S.W.2d 620 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
Assuming the supreme court does not abandon the window period enunciated in Moser on
rehearing, see infra notes 21-25 and accompanying text, the court will have to choose between Martin and Storm Assocs. to govern royalty interests created during the window
period.
20. In informal discussions with the author, several members of the Texas bar expressed
another concern regarding the supreme court's initial opinion. These attorneys argued that
the surface owner's right to damages is inadequate compensation for having his agricultural
acreage strip mined. Because of the legal requirements bearing on reclamation efforts, they
contend that the surface estate may be more valuable after strip mining than before. The
surface owner would be unable to recover damages, although his agricultural operations had
been displaced for a period of time. This worry might best be left to future case law, however, when specific remedies could be fashioned under the facts presented. The surface
owner would presumably be entitled to lost profits, as well as compensation for his cooperation in obtaining the necessary mining and reclamation permits.
21. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 430. The earlier date is that on which Acker v. Guinn, 464
S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1971), was decided. Acker was the first pronouncement of the surface
destruction test. The latter date is that of the initial Moser opinion.
22. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 430.
23. Id.
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also be valid. The surface owner's estate, created by a severance of the
mineral estate occurring before the window period, would thus have to
have included the surface minerals. The mineral estate owner, on the
other hand, received his property interest prior to the window period. He
might rightfully argue, therefore, that under Moser his reservation of minerals included near-surface minerals. Thus, both the mineral estate owner
and the surface mineral lessee arguably have valid claims to the surface
minerals.
The Moser window period raises a second problem. Under the surface
destruction test of Acker and Reed, ownership of a near-surface mineral
can be determined only by geological testing of near-surface mineral deposits. 24 One of the virtues of the Moser opinion is that the ownership of
such minerals can be determined by inspection of documents. This holding was intended to reduce the amount of litigation regarding the factfinding necessary for application of the Acker and Reed surface destruction test. Since Moser is not completely retroactive in application, however, the liklihood of litigation is not reduced. In examining title records
after June 8, 1983, one must still determine whether the surface owner or
the mineral owner held title to an unspecified surface mineral immediately
prior to that date. This determination is required in order for a title examiner to select either the chain of title out of the surface owner or the chain
of title out of the mineral owner in his tracking of title after June 8, 1983.25
B. Executive Right to Lease
In Manges v. Guerra 26 the supreme court was asked to determine the
remedies available to a mineral interest owner for a breach of the standard
of care incumbent upon an executive in its exercise of the executive right to
lease. Various members of the Guerra family sold surface acreage in
Texas to Clinton Manges. Manges also purchased a slight majority of the
underlying mineral interests and the executive right to lease all of the min24. Id. at 428.
25. A number of members of the Texas bar have informally suggested a two-pronged
solution to the problem of the Moser window period. First, these members suggest that the
window period created in Moser be eliminated. In order to protect the sizeable investment
in East Texas lignite fields and power generating stations, however, these lawyers suggest
that the supreme court should rule, in an appropriate case, that lignite is not a mineral. The
lignite would then belong to the surface estate owner. These attorneys contend that Heinatz
v. Allen, 147 Tex. 512, 217 S.W.2d 994 (1949), is authority for their approach. In Heinatz
the supreme court held that building stone and limestone are not minerals as a matter of
law. Id. at 1000. Although these substances were within the geological definition of a mineral, the Heinatz court reasoned that they gave structural support to the surface and thus
were not within the common meaning of a mineral. Id. at 997.
This suggested solution offers no help, however, to those with investments in surface deposits of uranium, iron ore, or coal. Furthermore, the suggested solution would require
courts to distinguish between lignite, on the one hand, and the harder forms of coal, such as
anthracite and bituminous coal, on the other. The need to distinguish lignite from the softer
varieties of bituminous coal might cause the courts to resort to the types of fact determinations that the Moser holdings were designed to avoid.
26. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 430 (June 8, 1983). The facts of this case have been simplified for
purposes of the following discussion.
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eral interests underlying the surface lands. Manges subsequently leased
part of the Guerra mineral interests to himself and successfully obtained
production. The Guerras brought suit, claiming that Manges had
breached his duty as executive by leasing the mineral interest to himself at
less than prevailing market terms. The trial court agreed that Manges had
breached his duty of utmost fair dealing toward the Guerras, and ordered
that (1) Manges be removed as holder of the executive rights to the Guerras' mineral interests; (2) the lease to Manges be cancelled as of the date of
execution, and the Guerras receive an accounting from Manges for the
27
proceeds from production reflecting the Guerras' status as co-tenants;
(3) the Guerras be awarded approximately $380,000 as compensation for
the consideration they would have received if their remaining mineral interests had been timely leased to a third person by Manges; (4) the Guerras
be awarded $500,000 in exemplary damages; and found that (5) various
deeds of trust and contracts executed by Manges did not cover the Guerras' mineral interests. The court of civil appeals affirmed the trial court's
28
judgment in all respects.
On appeal the supreme court held that the duty of utmost fair dealing is
an implied covenant, and that Manges's breach of this duty constituted a
breach of contract. 29 A majority of the supreme court evidently did not
believe that a separate tort had been alleged and proved by the Guerras,
however, and therefore denied the award of exemplary damages. 30 The
Texas Supreme Court further found that cancellation of Manges's executive right by the trial court was an overly drastic remedy, and that an
award of damages for failure to lease the Guerras' remaining mineral interests was adequate. 3 1 The supreme court also concluded that cancellation of the lease to Manges was unjustified, and instead determined that
the Guerras were entitled to additional actual damages to compensate
them for the differences in the terms of the Manges lease compared to the
likely terms of a third-party lease, as determined by the jury. 32 The
supreme court awarded the Guerras approximately $422,000 in lost bonuses, an accounting for past production to reflect a royalty to the Guerras
increased from one-eighth to one-sixth, and future payments from leasehold production in accordance with a one-sixth royalty interest. 33 In effect, the supreme court reformed the lease to Manges insofar as the bonus
27. This amount was approximately $932,000. We are told that "over $2,000,000" had
been produced from the leased tract, 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 43 1, and that the Guerras owned
46.58375% of the mineral estate, id. at 434 n.6.
28. 621 S.W.2d 652, 658 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1981).
29. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 433-35. The supreme court's discussion of the duty of utmost
fair dealing followed Kimsey v. Fore, 593 S.W.2d 107 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1979,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), discussedin Diem & Laity, Mineral Resources,Annual Survey of Texas Law,
35 Sw. L.J. 177, 180-82 (1981).

30. 26 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 435-38. Chief Justice Pope discussed this point in his separate
opinion, in which he concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 437-38. Justices Campbell and Wallace joined in this opinion.
31. Id. at 433.
32. Id. at 434.
33. Id.
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and royalty provisions were concerned. 34 The supreme court did not address any other terms of the lease to Manges that might have been deficient. The supreme court, for example, made no mention of adding a
Pugh clause to the Manges lease. Such a clause would discourage the operator from relaxing its efforts to develop the leased mineral estate, without
requiring the Guerras to resort to litigation based upon an implied covenant of reasonable development.
C OperatingAgreements
Decided cases interpreting operating agreements are few in number, so
the case of Hamilton v. Texas Oil & Gas Corp. 35 is especially welcome.
The operating agreement in Hamilton contained two provisions by which
working interest owners could elect to participate in the costs of a new
well. The first election was to participate in the drilling of a new well, and
the second was to participate in the completion of the new well. A working interest owner could therefore elect to participate in the drilling of a
new well without necessarily having to participate in that well's completion.36 Each of these elections provided that a nonconsenting party would
receive no revenues from the new well until the consenting working interest owners received, among other amounts, an amount from the revenues
party's share of the
of the new well equal to 400% of the nonconsenting
37
drilling or completion costs, as the case might be.
Texas Oil & Gas Corporation operated a unit in which defendant Hamilton was a nonoperator working interest owner. Texas Oil & Gas gave
notice to Hamilton of a proposed well, and Hamilton elected to participate
in the drilling of the new well. After Hamilton's election, the operator
shifted the site of the proposed well from the announced location to a
point 630 feet distant from the original site. Despite Hamilton's inquiries,
the operator gave no reason for the change. of site. Hamilton then notified
Texas Oil & Gas that he would bear no further expenses in connection
with the new well. The operator interpreted this message to mean that
Hamilton was not consenting to participate in the completion costs of the
new well. In the litigation that ultimately arose, Hamilton chose to ratify
his election to participate in the drilling of the new well. When production
from the new well began, Texas Oil & Gas withheld Hamilton's revenues
from the well in order to recoup 400% of Hamilton's share of completion
costs. The operator also sued Hamilton for his share of the drilling costs of
the new well.
34. See id. at 437 (Pope, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
35. 648 S.W.2d 316 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1982, no writ). This case also involved matters
other than the interpretation of the operating agreement. These issues are not discussed in
this Article.
36. The industry's standard form of operating agreement also contains these two elections if the parties choose Option No. 2 in article VII.D. 1 of the American Association of
Petroleum Landmen Form 610-1982, Model Form Operating Agreement.
37. The analogous provision in the industry's standard form may be found in article
VI.B.2 of the American Association of Petroleum Landmen Form 610-1982, Model Form
Operating Agreement.
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The case was tried to a jury, which found that Texas Oil & Gas (1) was
liable for gross negligence; (2) had failed to perform its operator duties in a
good and workmanlike manner; (3) had pursued an unconscionable course
of action against Hamilton; and (4) was not entitled to recover any additional drilling costs for the new well. The court awarded Hamilton $5000
in actual damages for the difference in preparation costs between the two
sites, $10,000 in exemplary damages, and attorneys' fees.
Hamilton appealed the trial court's ruling that he was not entitled to
recover the amount withheld by Texas Oil & Gas equal to 400% of his
share of the new well's completion costs. Hamilton in effect advanced
three arguments in support of his claim to his contractual risk percentage.
First, Hamilton contended that the operator's breach of the joint operating
agreement released him from the obligation of bearing the 400% contractual risk percentage. Second, Hamilton argued that Texas Oil & Gas owed
a fiduciary duty to him and that this duty had been breached. The proper
measure of damages for this breach, he argued, should be the amount
withheld as the contractual risk percentage. Third, Hamilton argued that
the provision of the joint operating agreement calling for the contractual
risk percentage was an unenforceable penalty provision rather than a valid
liquidated damages provision.
The court of appeals first determined that the drilling cost provisions of
the joint operating agreement were divisible from the completion cost provisions.38 Thus, the election by a working interest owner as to drilling was
distinct from his election as to completion. Since the operator had not
breached the agreement's provisions concerning completion of the new
well, the court reasoned that Hamilton was properly held to his obligations
under those provisions. 39 Second, the court of appeals found that Texas
Oil & Gas did not owe a fiduciary duty to Hamilton because a fiduciary
relationship exists between operator and nonoperator, on the basis of authority cited by Hamilton, only if they are engaged in a joint venture. 40 A
joint venture can exist between two parties, according to the cited author41
ity, only if the parties share the control or management of the enterprise.
The court of appeals found that Texas Oil & Gas had full control of all
operations and, therefore, owed no fiduciary duty to Hamilton. 42 Finally,
the court of appeals rejected Hamilton's third challenge to the enforceability of the contractual risk percentage by resorting to industry standards
and painting a bleak picture of the alternative. "To declare these provisions void as a penalty," the court wrote, "would permit non-consenting
parties to participate in the venture risk free."' 43 In addition, evidence at
38. 648 S.W.2d at 320.

39. Id.
40. Id. Hamilton had cited the case of Rankin v. Naftalis, 557 S.W.2d 940, 943 (Tex.
1977).
41. 648 S.W.2d at 321 (citing Ayco Dev. Corp. v. G.E.T. Serv. Co., 616 S.W.2d 184, 185
(Tex. 1981)).
42. 648 S.W.2d at 321. The court of appeals found persuasive the fact that Hamilton
and Texas Oil & Gas were severally, rather than jointly, liable. Id.
43. Id.
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trial showed that contractual risk percentages between 200% and 500%
were standard in the industry. The court of appeals also pointed out that
the contractual risk percentage was payable only out of production. The
court of appeals therefore denied Hamilton's claim for payment of the
withheld multiple of his share of completion costs. 4
II.

LEGISLATION

The Texas Legislature was active in the oil, gas and mineral area during
the survey period. The more significant legislation enacted can be placed
in four categories: (1) statutes enhancing the rights of royalty and mineral
interest owners as creditors; (2) statutes increasing the flexibility of public
leasing bodies; (3) enactments dealing with water quality and conservation; and (4) statutes affecting regulatory jurisdiction.
A.

Rights of Royalty and Mineral Interest Owners as Creditors

First purchasers of production from oil and gas wells must now observe
statutory deadlines for making payment to persons legally entitled to proceeds from the sale of oil or gas from Texas wells. 45 Moreover, late payments will accrue interest at a floating federal rate. 46 The well operator
may also be subject to these deadlines if the first purchaser makes all payments to the operator pursuant to an agreement that the operator then pay
the interest and royalty owners their respective shares. 4 7 The statute includes a de minimis provision 48 as well as notice requirements that must
be observed by an interest or royalty owner prior to instituting a lawsuit
for late payment. 49 The statute also provides exceptions to the requirement that interest be paid on late payments, 50 and royalties payable to
certain state bodies are specifically exempt from coverage by the statute. 552'
The addition of section 9.319 to the Texas Uniform Commercial Code
also strengthens the position of oil and gas interest owners as creditors.
This new section grants a security interest, perfected automatically without
filing, to an interest owner in oil and gas production, which secures the first
purchaser's obligation to pay the purchase price of the production.5 3 The
54
security interest continues in the proceeds of the oil and gas production.
44. Id.
45. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 91.402 (Vernon Supp. 1984). Some of these deadlines
may be varied by contract. See id.
46. Id. § 91.403. Subsection (a) provides that a different rate of interest may be specified by contract.
47. Id. § 91.401(2).
48. Id. § 91.402(b). If the total amount owed is $2500 or less, payments can be remitted
annually to the payee.
49. Id. § 91.404(a).

50. Id. § 91.403(b).
51. Id. § 91.405 (covers Board of Regents of University of Texas and General Land
Office).
52. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.319 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1984).

53. Id. § 9.319(a).
54. Id. § 9.319(c).
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The section also creates a statutory lien in favor of an interest owner who
fails to qualify for the security interest created by the section due to one of
a specified set of reasons. 55 A statutory lien is also created to secure the
56
payment of taxes that should be withheld or paid by the first purchaser.
The statute does not specify the type of property that these liens encumber,
but presumably the liens attach
to oil and gas production as well as to the
57
proceeds of such production.
A security interest created by section 9.319 will be deemed a purchase
money security interest for purposes of determining priorities under section 9.312 of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code. 58 The holder of such
a security interest, however, is relieved from the written notice requirements of section 9.312(c). 59 The statutory liens created by the new section
are subordinate to all perfected chapter 9 security interests, but are superior to all unperfected chapter 9 security interests as well as to the interests
of the lien creditors, buyers, and transferees listed in section 9.301 of the
Texas Uniform Commercial Code. 60 For this reason, oil and gas interest
owners are now in a stronger position than the trustee in bankruptcy as to
61
their first purchaser of production.
The new section 9.319 also specifies the priorities among the security
interests and statutory liens created by the section itself.62 An interest
owner's operator apparently does not fall within the definition of a first
purchaser. 63 The section does, however, permit a first purchaser to make
payment for gas production jointly to an operator and an interest owner as
a means of terminating the interest owner's security interest in the production. 64 Such joint payment will not terminate an interest owner's security
interest in oil production, however, unless the interest owner has agreed to
such an arrangement. 65 The new section also provides ways in which a
buyer may purchase from a first purchaser free of the security interests and
statutory liens created by the new section. 66 Remedies available to interest
owners under this section include replevin, garnishment, and attachment,
67
as well as the chapter 9 remedies generally available to secured parties.
68
Also, the security interests defined by the new section may be assigned.
6
9
The final subsections define the principal terms used in the section. Finally, the legislature made conforming changes to sections 9.302(a) and
55. Id. § 9.319(d).
56. Id.
57. See id.

58. Id. § 9.319(0(1).
59. Id.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. § 9.319(0(2).
See id. § 9.301(c).
Id. § 9.319(g).
See id. § 9.319(q)(3).
Id. § 9.319(/)(1).
Id. § 9.319(1)(2).
Id. § 9.319(m).
Id. § 9.319(n).

68. Id. § 9.319(j).
69. See id. § 9.319(q).
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70
9.312(c) of the Texas Uniform Commercial Code.

B. IncreasedFlexibility of Public Leasing Bodies
A new section of the Natural Resources Code provides that the mineral
reservation for lands dedicated to the permanent school fund and subsequently sold now consists of a mineral interest rather than a royalty. 7 1
These reserved interests, which will be defined by the School Land Board,
are no less than one-eighth for sulphur and no less than one-sixteenth for
all other minerals. 72 In addition, leases covering public school land, gulf
land, and riverbeds and channels that belong to the State of Texas may
now be made for a primary term of less than five years. 73 The Board for
Lease of University Lands is now authorized either to stipulate the royalty
to be paid under a proposed oil and gas lease covering Permanent University Fund lands and to receive competitive bids on the bonus payable for
the lease, or to stipulate the bonus and take bids for the royalty. 74 The
legislature separately repealed the provisions of the Natural Resources
Code dealing with permits for prospecting for and development of oil and
75
gas on certain public lands, and for leasing such lands for oil and gas.
Water Quality and Conservation
The enactments during the survey period in this area address the
problems of plugging oil and gas wells and maintaining the state's supply
of fresh water. The legislature created a well plugging fund and placed the
fund under the control of the Texas Railroad Commission. 76 The fund
will be financed through drilling permit fees, 77 penalties and bonds associated with state plugging requirements, and plugging expenses recovered by
the commission from interest owners. 78 Legislative appropriations may
supplement the fund.79 The commission is to use the fund to plug abandoned wells and to enforce laws and regulations relating to pollution. 80
Landowners will no longer be liable for the costs of plugging an abandoned well on their property. 8 ' Also, the commission may now take steps,
without a hearing, to plug an abandoned well if the well poses a serious
threat of pollution or injury to the public health. 82 The Texas Railroad
Commission's enforcement authority for matters concerning pollution has
C.

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See id §§ 9.302(a), .312(c).
TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 51.054(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).
Id.
Id. § 52.082.
TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 66.65(a) (Vernon Supp. 1984).

75. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 52.221-.252 (Vernon 1978), repealed by Act of Feb.
1, 1983, ch. 1, § 1, 1983 Tex Gen. Laws 1.

76. TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. § 89.151 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
77. Id. § 85.2021 (drilling permit fee will be $100 for each drilling permit application
filed with the commission).
78. Id. § 89.152.

79. Id.
80. Id. § 89.151.

81. See id. §§ 89.081, .083, .042-.043, .045.
82. Id. § 89.043(b).
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also been strengthened.8 3 The legislature increased significantly various
penalties for pollution and liberalized venue provisions for recovering civil
penalties.8 4 The commission was also given increased access to private
85
property and records to aid in its regulation of pollution in the state.
D. Statutes Affecting Regulatory Jurisdiction
Saltwater disposal pits are now under the jurisdiction of the Railroad
Commission and include those pits used to store or evaporate oilfield
brines. 86 Saltwater pits that do not conform to regulations to be issued by
the commission are prohibited.8 7 The commission may enjoin the operation of a nonconforming saltwater pit and may close it at the pit operator's
expense. 88 The operator of a nonconforming pit may also be subject to
civil and criminal penalties.8 9 The legislature also created a saltwater disposal pit fund, which will be financed with penalties and costs recovered
from operators of nonconforming pits.90 The commission will use the
fund to close saltwater disposal pits.9 1 In addition, the legislature
the use of fresh water in injection
amended the Water Code to discourage 92
wells used for enhanced recovery of oil.
The legislature gave the Texas Water Commission jurisdiction to regulate mining shafts. 93 Permits are now required for all shafts, whether
mined or drilled, if the primary purpose of the shaft is to transport workers
and materials for specified purposes. 94 Shafts that do not penetrate the
base of the uppermost water-bearing strata, however, are excluded from
regulation.9 5 The statute also provides for both civil and criminal penalties.96 A second amendment to the Water Code transferred jurisdiction
over injection wells used for the in situ recovery of tar sands from the
Water Commission to the Railroad Commission. 97 In addition, the Railroad Commission has been given exclusive jurisdiction over iron ore and
iron ore gravel mining and reclamation operations. 98 The commission is
to regulate these operations in the same manner that it regulates surface
coal mining and reclamation.9 9 The Texas Legislature also created a
means by which surface owners may restrict the mineral use of suburban
83. See id. §§ 88.135, 91.351, 91.352, 141.101, 141.102.

84. Id. §§ 85.351, 85.381, 85.382, 86.222, 86.223, 87.241, 88.131.
85. Id. §§ 91.1012, 141.013.

86. Id. §§ 91.453, .451.
87. Id. § 91.452.
88.
89.
90.
91.

Id. §§ 91.456-.457.
Id. §§ 92.458-.459.
Id. § 91.458.
Id.
92. TEX. WATER CODE ANN. § 27.0511 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
93. Id. § 28.021.
94. Id.; see id. § 28.001(5). Various information is required in connection with a permit

application. See id. §§ 28.023, .033, .034, .035.
95. Id. § 28.001(5).
96. Id. §§ 28.061, .065.
97. Id. § 27.035; see Act of May 20, 1983, ch. 184, § 2, 1983 Tex. Gen. Laws 754, 755.
98. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5920-11, § 4 (Vernon 1964 & Supp. 1984).
99. Id.
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subdivisions.'00 Under rules to be issued by the Railroad Commission, a
surface owner of a suburban tract of land may create an area of up to 160
acres in size, with at least two operations sites and appropriate road and
pipeline easements.' 0' Commercial, industrial, and residential subdivisions may qualify under the statute. 0 2 Owners of possessory mineral interests within such a qualified subdivision will be required to use only the
in the operations sites, and to use the designated
surface contained
03
easements.'
III.

RULES AND REGULATIONS

The Railroad Commission amended its rules to prohibit, except in specified circumstances, the use of gas line manifolds that permit bypassing of
gas production meters.1°4 The amendments clarify the requirement that
gas be measured separately from each completion.' 0 5 Other amendments
to the commission's rules specify in greater detail the technical requirements for the casing and cementing of oil, gas, and other wells, 0 6 and for
the plugging of inactive oil and gas wells.'0 7 These technical requirements
are designed to protect fresh water from pollution and to prevent the uncontrolled escape of oil and gas either to the surface or to other strata.'0 8
The Railroad Commission has also amended its rules to require a $100 fee
for each application or materially amended application to drill, deepen,
plug back, or reenter a well.' 0 9 This amendment conforms the commission's rules to recent legislation enacted by the Texas Legislature. I0

NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 92.001-.007 (Vernon Supp. 1984).
101. Id. § 92.003; see id. § 92.002(3).
102. See id. § 92.002(3)(B).

100. TEX.

103. Id. § 92.005.
104. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 8 Tex. Reg. 1019 (1983) (amending 16 TEX.

ADMIN. CODE

§ 3.27).
105. Id.
106. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 8 Tex. Reg. 3982 (1983) (amending 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.13).
107. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 8 Tex. Reg. 3989 (1983) (amending 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3.14).

108. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 8 Tex. Reg. 3982, 3989 (1983) (preambles).
109. Tex. R.R. Comm'n, 8 Tex. Reg. 2324 (1983), adopted, 8 Tex. Reg. 3184 (1983)
(amending 16 TEX. ADMIN. CODE § 3.5).
110. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.

